Pace Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 3 After Gender?: Examining International
Justice Enterprises

Article 4

June 2011

What Role for “Women,” “Men,” and Transpeople/Intersex People
in Gender Equality?: A Commentary
Edward Stein
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward Stein, What Role for “Women,” “Men,” and Transpeople/Intersex People in Gender
Equality?: A Commentary, 31 Pace L. Rev. 821 (2011)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

What Role for “Women,” “Men,”
and Transpeople/Intersex People
in Gender Equality?:
A Commentary
Edward Stein*
This has been a very rich opening panel to what promises
to be a terrific conference. The panelists’ comments go in such
varied directions that it is a challenge to be both a
commentator and summarizer, especially when I have just a
few minutes to speak. What I plan to do is say a little bit to
draw together some of the themes that the panelists have been
talking about that are connected to a couple of topics I have
been working on while at the same time trying to look forward
to some of the things I hope we are going to be talking about
the rest of the day.
I have been returning to some questions relating to
immutability, about which Janet Halley and I were both
writing in the early nineties. I recently reread Janet’s Stanford
Law Review paper on that topic,1 which was very influential for
my thinking. Some of these issues in that article relate to
biological theories of the origins of sexual orientations and
their relevance to constitutional law arguments in U.S.
contexts. Some of the ideas that animate that article may seem
outdated—for example, the discussion of essentialism and
constructionism about sexual orientation2 is cast in a different
* Vice Dean, Professor of Law, and Director of the Program for Family
Law, Policy, and Bioethics, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; J.D., Yale
University; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.A., Williams
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1. Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the New Argument from Immutability, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 503
(1994).
2. For some classic essays that frame the date about essentialism and
constructionism at the time, see FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein, ed. 1990). See
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way than it is typically framed today and much has changed
about the legal framework of the relevant U.S. constitutional
law.3 But some of the questions present in that article remain
live questions today and we are grappling with them on this
panel. We are talking about gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, sexual desire, and sexual behaviors more
generally. These phenomena are manifest in humans, who are
complex creatures with many characteristics and rich cognitive
lives. The characteristics of individual humans can change,
sometimes through choices that we make, sometimes through
the environments that we are in, sometimes as a result of
economic forces, and sometimes through medical procedures on
our bodies that are undertaken willingly or unwillingly. The
categories that we use for thinking about ourselves and the
world also change. They change over time, they change with
new discoveries, and so forth. So although we take for granted
the categories of sex, gender, race, gender identity, and sexual
orientation, we need to realize that these categories are also
changing. These categories for describing people are also used
in the law and by legal systems, and they can be used in the
law in ways that can both oppress or liberate. How we think
about these categories and how we can and do change them is
something that people on this panel have been talking about in
useful ways.
When scholars, myself included, are thinking about the
law, gender, sexuality, gender identity, and the like in a
theoretical way, we often do so from the particular legal context
in which we find ourselves. We are talking about U.S. law—in
this context, for example, same-sex marriage in the United
States or immutability as it plays itself out in the U.S.
constitutional context. Looking forward to the next panels,
what I am hoping will happen in the conference today is that
we will continue to look at gender and sexuality in both a
comparative way (as some people on this panel have started to
do) and from the perspective and context of international law.
also EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY AND
ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 71-116 (1999).
3. For example, Halley’s essay was written before Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Part of what I hope we will be doing going forward is using
these perspectives to think outside of our particular cultural
categories and, thereby, impact how we think about this
complicated set of issues that we have started talking about on
the panel today.
I hope these brief remarks have drawn together some of
the questions that people on this panel have talked about while
anticipating the conversations that we will be continuing to
have today.
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